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France's 1998 implementation of the 35-hour workweek has been
one of the greatest regulatory shocks on labor markets. Few studies
evaluate the impact of this regulation because of a lack of identifi-
cation strategies. For historical reasons due to the way Alsace-Moselle
was returned to France in 1918, the implementation of France's 35-
hour workweek was less stringent in that region than in the rest of
the country, which is confirmed by double and triple differences. Yet
it shows no significant difference in employment with the rest of
France, which casts doubt on the effectiveness of this regulation.
I. Introduction
The experience of working time reduction in France has been one of
the most significant regulatory shocks imposed on any large economy.
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In 1998 and 2000, following laws known as Aubry I (which encouraged
firms with over 20 employees to reduce working time) and Aubry II
(which made working time reduction mandatory), France changed its
working time regulation from the official 39 hours to 35 hours. This 10%
reduction was implemented with no change to the net monthly wages of
workers who were employed at this time. The implementation of this
regulation constitutes a relatively far-reaching and unique experiment
from which much can be learned about the underlying functionmg of
labor markets in general.' The experience also generated considerable de-
bate in several European countries.
Despite the importance of this shock and the political controversy sur-
rounding it, there have been few studies based on microeconomic evidence
that evaluate the impact of a working time reduction in France. In our
view, this is primarily due to the absence of proper identification strategies.
Unlike the United States or Canada, France lacks a federal structure;
therefore, most laws and decrees apply to the entire territory, which makes
very problematic the identification of appropriate control groups involv-
ing firms or workers unaffected by the experiment. Moreover, a reduction
in working time (hereafter RWT) has been accompanied by payroll tax
exemptions, smoothing of hours over the year {annualisation in French),
and a number of specific collective labor agreements that, together, add
to the difficulty of disentangling the specific effect of RWT.
The goal of this paper is to provide a methodology that overcomes this
identification problem by making use of a relatively unknown French
specificity. France's territorial organization is less centralized and ho-
mogeneous than is generally assumed. For example, for historical reasons,
the region of Alsace and the subregion, hereafter named département., of
Moselle have laws that differ from those of the rest of the republic. Both
areas belonged to Germany from 1870 to 1918 and, upon rejoining France,
retained some favorable elements of the German legal system. In partic-
ular, two holidays that are unrecognized elsewhere in the country are
preserved in these areas: Saint-Etienne (Saint Stephen's Day, December
26) and Vendredi Saint (Good Friday). However, when the RWT took
effect in 1998 and 2000, firms in Alsace-Moselle decided that both holidays
would be counted as part of the working time reduction. Therefore, the
application of the RWT has been less favorable in Alsace-Moselle than in
the rest of France, at least until employee recourses began to be examined
by various legal courts.
I
' Despite the official obligation that wages not be cut in response to a working
time reduction, theory indicates that newly hired workers tnust have faced a
decline in monthly wages, attenuating the law's impact. Similarly, fringe benefits
to already employed workers may have been reneged following the law's appli-
cation in order to restore hourly wages.
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This is the basts for our identification strategy. We will compare the
evolution of hours, employment, and wages in France (by which we mean
France without Alsace-Moselle) and in Alsace-Moselle. Using data from
Enquête Emploi, a French labor force survey from 1996 to 2003, we are
able to use a standard d¡fference-in-dífferences approach and investigate
the differential impact of RWT in France and in Alsace-Moselle.
However, this is not as straightforward as it seems: Alsace and Moselle
have the particular distinction of being the only areas in France that share
a border with Germany. This is a serious issue in our identification process:
during the period under investigation, Germany faced a relatively strong
recession that threatened to spill over into Alsace-Moselle. Thus, a simple
comparison of these areas with the rest of France is likely to be spurious.
In particular, it is possible that a rise in relative unemployment in Alsace-
Moselle could simply be the result of Germany's recession dispropor-
tionately affecting northeastern France.
For this reason, we will mostly present triple difference (DDD) esti-
mates, wherein the additional reference groups will consist of firms or
occupations unaffected by the RWT (i.e., firms of fewer than 20 employees
or independent workers). At this point, it is interesting to note that by
using a DDD approach, we find that working hours in Alsace-Moselle
rose relative to the rest of France by approximately the amount predicted
by theory, despite the fact that Germany was concurrently experiencing
a recession. This makes us reasonably confident that the difference in the
number of working hours in Alsace-Moselle is exogenous to the German
economic cycle and is instead attributable to legislative differences within
France.
Our paper is organized into six sections. Section IT presents France's
RWT experiment and a selective Hterature review of ex post evaluations
based on either microeconomic data or macroeconomic models. AH such
existing studies have ignored the France/Alsace-Moselle divide. We will
then discuss the specificity of the Alsace-Moselle experiment. Section III
presents a model with which we discuss a number of econometric issues,
such as the selection of firms that entered into early RWT agreements.
Section IV provides greater detail of our identification strategy. Since the
existence of regional differences is typically ignored in examinations of
French data, we devote Section V to providing detailed evidence that the
strategy is valid. In particular, we show that workers in Alsace-Moselle
worked more relative to the rest of France: the DDD coefficients are
positive and significant over the relevant period. Further, the theoretical
coefficient (16 hours per year, i.e., 0.35 hour per week worked) is always
m the confidence interval. In Section VI, we employ the identification
strategy to measure the effect of RWT on employment probability and
unemployment incidence. We observe that the differential application of
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the 35-hour law across regions did not have any relative employment
impact.
II. Reduction in Working Time
A. 35 Hours: The Law
From a legal viewpoint, France's switch from a 39-höur to a 35-hour
workweek in 2000 was a complex process, implemented after a lengthy
negotiation process and several litigations. Two laws were proposed by
the Jospin government, a coalition of socialists, communists, and the
Green Party, and were voted on in Parliament. The first, on June 13, 1998
(known as the LoÍ Aubry I), was designed to provide firms with strong
incentives to negotiate working time reductions of at least 10% at the
firm or industry level. Incentives for such reductions were numerous.
Foremost, firms obtained a subsidy for each worker in the firm if they
raised employment by at least 6% following a decrease in working time
and an even larger subsidy for an employment Increase over 9%. This
subsidy was quite large (between €800 and €1,500 per worker) and de-
gressive over time. It was not applicable to agreements signed after the
second semester of 1999 for firms with over 20 employees (a delay of
1-2 subsequent years was granted to smaller firms) m order to speed up
the transition to the new legal working time. Finally, as an incentive for
firms to reduce working time promptly, the Loi Aubry I specified that
in 2000 (for firms with over 20 employees) or in 2002 (for smaller firms),
the 35-hour workweek both would be irreversible and would be uni-
formly applied to all firms, even those not having signed an agreement.
The second law, passed January 19, 2000 (known as the Loi Aubry II),
enforced the Loi Aubry I by setting the official working time at 35 hours
per week in all firms, modifying all relevant articles of the Code du Travail.
A decrease in working time from 39 hours to 35 hours represents an
11% reduction in hours worked per week. However, this does not nec-
essarily imply that, at a fixed weekly wage and in the absence of subsidies,
firms faced an 11 % increase in hourly labor costs. Firms also had various
adjustment mechanisms. For example, one such mechanism was overtime.
Before the reform, firms were required to pay a compulsory overtime
premium of 25% for the first 8 hours over 39 and then a 50% premium
from then onward. Following the reform, the activation point for the
overtime premium was shifted to 35 hours, and a second activation point
was introduced at 43 hours. Figure 1 represents the wage profile before
and after the 2000 reform in firms of more than 20 employees until 2003
(when the overtime premium was eventually reduced; see below).
For hourly wages earned by employees in these firms working 39 hours
before and after the reform, labor costs increased by (4 x 0.25)/39 =
2.5%. For employees working 43 hours before and after the reform, labor
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FIG. 1.—Weekly wage profile before and after the reform in firms with more than 20
employees. The slope of the wage is the base hourly wage (denoted by to for convenience)
before the overtime cutoff point (39A or 35¿), w x 1.25 between the cutoff point and the
second cutoff point (48/? or 43A), and w x 1.50 between 43A and 48/7 in the postreform
period.
costs increased by (0.25 x 8)/43 = 4.7%. Finally, for employees working
45 hours before and after the reform, the increase in labor costs amounted
to (0.25 X 8 -H 0.5 X 2)/45 = 6.7%. In short, the reform made overtime
more costly, especially overtime exceeding 43 hours.
The two laws have been widely debated. For example, the Conseil
Constitutionnel (France's equivalent of the Supreme Court) nullified sev-
eral items of the Aubry II law. There were also many different interpre-
tations of how vacation days should be calculated, how overtime should
be paid, and how collective agreements could bypass the law. As late as
October 2006, more than 6^  years after the reform, the Conseil d'Etat
(another Supreme Court devoted to litigations in the public sector) in-
validated a collective agreement in the public health sector as a result of
a conflict with the main law.
Jospin's left-wing coalition was defeated in the 2002 presidential elec-
tions. In 2003 and 2004, the new right-wing Parliament voted for two
additional laws that imposed constraints on overtime wages. In particular,
the overtime costs were reduced from 25% to 10% in 2003; during the
following year, the legal working time (1,600 annual hours) was aug-
mented to 1,607 hours with an additional day of work for all French
firms and administrations (usually on Pentecost) in order to finance health
spending for the elderly.
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FIG. 2.—Timing of the 35-hour reform for firms with greater than and less than 20
employees.
In short, the timing of the RWT was not simple and can be broken
down as follows:
1. Between 1998 and 2000, incentives were provided in order to reduce
working time by 10% or greater (e.g., subsidy increases in cases in
which working time was reduced by 15% and employment ex-
panded by 9%; subsidies were also given to firms that claimed that
they would be required to fire workers in the absence of an agree-
ment on working time reduction; finally, after a period of time, all
subsidies would disappear, giving incentives to reduce working time
as early as possible following the first law).
2. In 2000, the RWT was almost uniformly enforced by law through-
out the territory. It was applied differently according to activity
sectors and dependmg on renegotiations with the various conven-
tions de branches and the timing of the agreement.
3. In 2003—4, recourse to overtime was eased and its cost decreased.
The number of firms and employees that switched to the 35-hour re-
gime was recorded on a monthly basis by the administration. Here we
report data that show the progressive switch for larger firms between 1998
and 2000, the sudden increase in 2000, and the same process, but with a
lag of 2 years, for firms with fewer than 20 employees. Note that the
firms with fewer than 10 employees have not yet been subject to any
working time reduction. Figures 2 and 3 provide an overview of the timing
of the change for the firms with more than and fewer than 20 employees
(fig. 3 uses a logarithmic scale).
B. A Selective Literature Review
The literature on work sharing is vast and has typically established a
negative employment effect (Rosen 1968; Ehrenberg 1971; Calmfors and
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FIG. 3.—Timing of the 35-hour reform for firms with greater than and less than 20
employees {logarithmic scale).
Hoel 1988; Hunt 1999; Grépon and Kramarz 2002; see also Marimon and
Zilibotti [2000] for a detailed theoretical analysis). The purpose of this
paper is not to systematically survey the theoretical and empirical argu-
ments for work sharing. Rather, we aim to survey various evaluations of
the French experiment. The three most comprehensive surveys on the 35-
hour experience are completed by Gahuc (2001), Askenazy (2005), and
Kramarz et al. (2008). Gahuc and Askenazy classify the various available
estimates of the 35-hour experience into two categories: approaches based
on macroeconomic models and approaches based on microeconometric
evidence. Those based on macroeconomic models depend on Keynesian
effects. Their estimates of the employment effect typically depend on time-
series evaluations and have been severely criticized. Further, both authors
argue that microeconomic data are the most informative and may be the
only rigorous methodology to employ in such a context. The objective
is to compare the employment evolution of firms that switched to the
35-hour regime (treatment group) with that of firms that did not switch
(control group). Unfortunately, it is likely that the treatment of the treated
group differs from the treatment of the control group; thus, the key
difficulty consists in dealing with the endogeneity of the agreement at the
firm level on the 35-hour regime. Matching methods are a potentially
powerful methodology with which to build a control group; however, as
explained by Askenazy (2005), these methods account for only selection
in a 35-hour agreement based on observables. This raises the question as
to why some similar firms selected into the 35-hour reform but others
did not.
In the latter survey by Kramarz et al. (2008), the authors explore the
impact of the 35-hour reform with a similar methodology. They recognize
that their analysis precludes causality since it is difficult to find a model
that explains when and why firms decided to switch to the 35-hour regime
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and sign agreements with their workers. Grépon, Leclair, and Roux (2004)
attempt to find an instrumental variable that would affect the decision to
reduce working time without having an effect on economic outcomes.
They use the predicted amount of Aubry II subsidies that firms would
have obtained per worker had they switched to the 35-hour workweek.
However, the source of variation in the amount of Aubry II subsidies
per worker across firms is correlated with the share of low- and high-
wage workers. Comparing firms with more or less Aubry II subsidies
may be equivalent to comparing firms with more or fewer low-wage
workers. Firms with more or fewer low-wage workers differ systemati-
cally in unobservable ways. For example, one might argue that firms with
a great number of low-wage workers are more likely to be unionized and
to switch to the 35-hour reform. Additionally, a considerable amount of
economic literature argues that unions have an independent impact on
employment and productivity. Therefore, the amount of Aubry II sub-
sidies a firm receives per worker may not be exogenous and then may
not be a valid instrumental variable, although the direction of the bias is
unclear.
An alternative strategy was implemented in a recent paper by Estevao
and Sa (2006). They investigate the impact of a 35-hour workweek on
several dimensions (stress, dual job holding, share of employment in firms,
average pay of newly hired workers, employment) by exploiting the dis-
tinction between small and large firms regarding the timing of the im-
plementation of the reform. As we argue in the paper, their methodology
is a useful gateway for future research since it considerably improves on
previous methodologies that were based solely on macroeconomic models
and data. However, in order to draw conclusions on the impact of a
working time reduction on the economy and to infer causality, their iden-
tification strategy also requires that the time effects for small and large
firms are identical over the period of interest and that the responses of
small and large firms to a regulatory shock on hours are the same. In our
paper, we nest this identification strategy in offering triple differences. In
addition to the previous methodology, we compare large firms affected
by the 35-hour workweek with large firms affected in a milder way by
the regulation (i.e., large firms in Alsace-Moselle). Gompared to the meth-
odology employed by Estevao and Sa, we do not focus on the various
dimensions (stress, dual job holding, etc.), although our methodology can
easily be adapted to address those questions.
i n . A Model of Working Time Reduction
A. Setup
Our goal in this section is to provide a simple analytical model of a
working time reduction applicable to the French case. In particular, our
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setup includes both extra overtime costs for employers (weekly wages are
convex in hours) and overtime costs affected by legislation changes. Other
aspects of working hour regulations, such as the impact of labor costs on
prices and on subsequent demand for produced goods, are ignored. In
order to provide the simplest illustration of the empirical challenge facing
most evaluations of the 35-hour law, we take a proponent's viewpoint
and assume the most favorable case in which firms face a fixed demand
for their output and, thus, must supply a fixed number of hours, denoted
by H. h would be very easy to relax such an assumption and assume that
H depends negatively on the cost of labor due to the elasticity of the
demand for goods. Richer specifications can be found in Calmfors and
Hoel (1988).
We denote by h the number of hours per worker and by N employment
in a given firm. Thus, the firm chooses hours and employment subject
to
hN = H.
The firm's objective is to minimize its total production cost C(¿, N). To
account for the fact that employment and hours are not perfect substitutes,
this cost can be broken down as follows:
C(/j, N) = w{h)N + bjN,
where Ô, is the cost per worker in firm ;' (which could be interpreted as
a coordination cost), and the function wQj) is an increasing, convex weekly
wage profile. Denote by e(¿) = hw'{h)/w{h) > 1 the elasticity of the wage
profile to wages.
Different firms may have different workplace organization and hence
a larger or a smaller ô^ . Replacing h by H/N in the cost function, we have
the objective of the firm as follows:
minC{H/N, N) = m\nw{H/N)N + Ô.N, .
which leads to a simple first-order condition:
Figure 4 illustrates the determination of the equilibrium hours as the
intersection between the curve w{h){e - 1) and the horizontal line S^  in a
point h^. The higher the cost per employee, the higher the choice of hours
h^ and thus the lower employment TV^  = H/h^. As figure 4 further il-
lustrates, a reduction in legal working time that makes overtime more
costly will raise the wage profile -w to w* after a given threshold point
/JQ, which can be thought of as the new legal working time, for example,
35¿. With this new wage profile, overtime above the legal threshold is
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FIG. 4.—Equilibrium determination of hours worked per employee before and after the
reform, in the absence of other government intervention.
more costly, and thus the firm optimally raises employment and reduces
hours worked, to a point hg-
However, the employment effect may not be large enough. First, even
if we assume that H does not vary with the increase in labor costs, hg
may still be above the target h^. Second, the total demand for hours at
the firm level may decline: if labor costs raise production prices and the
demand for goods is elastic, H itself will decline. This is why, in the
process of reducing working time, the government added a subsidy to
firms that was approximately proportional to hirings. Thus the cost func-
tion of the firm is augmented by a (negative) term -{a + SN), where S
is the per-worker subsidy and a is a possibly lump-sum transfer. After
taking the first-order conditions, this subsidy simply moves the horizontal
line (cost per employee) to a lower level (see fig. 5).
In summary, (I) even with a constant volume of hours H, the em-
ployment effect can be lower than expected if firms prefer to choose an
intermediate level of hours (e.g., a number between h^ = 35 and h^ =
39). (2) The value of H itself may decrease as a result of the rise in labor
costs. In this case, the government needs to subsidize employment with
a positive S per employee.
B. Other Issues: Heterogeneity of Workers and Self-Selection of Firms
It is possible that workers are heterogeneous in terms of their prefer-
ences for leisure. Here we simply modeled the labor demand side, but
there might be interesting effects of the reform on the supply side as well.
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FIG. 5.—Equilibrium determination of hours worked per employee after the reform and
with government subsidies 5.
In particular, in a competitive market, firms and workers would sort
according to preferences: workers preferring low work hours would go
to firms offering lower work hours and, similarly, for those workers
preferring a greater number of work hours. However, by later Jnvesti-
gatmg the sample of only full-time workers, we limit the importance of
variations in workers' preferences. Therefore, in a first order, our model
without workers' heterogeneity captures the actual effects in the data. Of
course, it may also be the case that workers within the full-time group
also have different preferences. Some may want to move to a 35-hour
workweek, whereas others may prefer to maintain their 39-hour work-
week. Our view is that the preferences over working time for firms and
for workers are subject to an externality: if everyone works 39 hours, it
is more costly for the firm to deviate for one worker. In this way, firms
do not want to have too many different contracts with different hours
worked. With such an externality, the possibility of a "compensating dif-
ferential" of different working hours in different firms is limited in prac-
tice. Similarly, if everyone works 35 hours, it may be more difficult for
a worker to be the only one to work 39 hours. Burda and Weil (2005)
have a nice theory that addresses such externalities and implications for
the regulation of working time.^
' In a model with heterogeneous workers, firms would indeed fix different
hours, corresponding to a tangency point between iso-utility, a concave curve in
the space (w, h), and an iso-cost line, a convex curve in that space. A legal reduction
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The model also points out some dimensions of heterogeneity at the
firm level, illustrated by the fact that 6^  depends on the firm. This simply
means that firms have a different hours-employment trade-off and, thus,
react differently to changes in overtime regulations. For the employment
impact of a policy change to be the same across all firms despite different
5^ , we require that the profile w{h){E — 1) be linear, a condition unlikely
to be met. As we will discuss below, our identification strategy is immune
to these problems.
IV. Identification Strategy: The 35-Hour Reform in Alsace-Moselle
A. Details of the Alsace-Moselle Experience
As noted earlier, the implementation of the 35-hour reform was, to a
large extent, nationwide, making the identification of the causal effect
difficult at the macroeconomic level. Simply comparing unemployment
rates before and after the reform would confound the impact of the reform
with the ongoing macroeconomic trend. In contrast, an identification
based on regional differences is able to capture the reform's causal effect.
A historical accident provides a regional difference in the implemen-
tation of the reform between Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France. Figure
6 represents France, where Alsace-Moselle corresponds to three dépar-
tements in the northeastern part of France, those with numbers 67, 68
(Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin), and 57 (Moselle). As noted previously, Alsace-
Moselle has had two supplementary public holidays (December 26 and
Good Friday) in effect since the adoption of the German legal code in
1890. Insofar as they were opportunistically converted by employers into
the RWT, the amount of work supplied in firms decreased less in Alsace-
Moselle than elsewhere.
There is clear anecdotal evidence confirming this phenomenon. For
example, Laurence Grisey-Martinez, a lawyer at the Institut du Droit
Local Alsacien-Mosellan, an institute in charge of raising awareness about
the specificities of local Alsace-Moselle laws, writes about this phenom-
enon in the Revne du Droit Local (no. 44, June 2005). In this instance,
a case was brought to the attention of the courts in 2002 in which the
letters RTT (the French translation of RWT) were written on the calendar
of a firm for the following December 26.
The employees, having been stripped of an "RWT day," questioned the
legitimacy of employers "using" the RWT on a day that is, according to
Alsace-Moselle's local laws, deemed a statutory holiday. Finally, on Oc-
in working hours again makes the iso-cost curve more convex since w{h) is more
curved. Hence, optimal hours are reduced for each given worker. The main mes-
sage of the model is therefore unchanged. The net effect of the reform on hours
may be lower than in the absence of workers' heterogeneity, but this is not
necessarily always the case.
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FIG. 6.—Map of the 95 French départements. Alsace-Moselle are départements numbers
57, 67, and 68 in the northeastern part of France.
tober 23, 2002, the local council {ca.\led prud'hommes de Metz) stated that
"December 26 must be considered a bank holiday as per the special dis-
positions of the local laws in Alsace-Moselle, this day cannot be counted
as a reduction of working time (RWT)" (Grisey-Martinez 2005, 2).
This is the basis of our identification strategy: between 2000 and 2002,
some employers in Alsace-Moselle attempted to attenuate the impact of
RWT by including holidays as part of the reduction in working time,
thereby attempting to integrate them into the less favorable regime of
France's common law. Gode du Travail. As these two additional holidays
are not mentioned in the Gode du Travail, this was a relatively easy task
for Alsace-Moselle employers, at least up until the local council established
a jurisprudence.
It follows that we should observe a weaker impact of the 35-hour reform
in Alsace-Moselle: 2 days represent 16 hours of work per year. The 35-
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hour reform corresponds to a reduction of 4 hours per week throughout
the 46-week work year, for a total reduction of 184 hours. Therefore,
there is a 9% variation in the impact of the 35-hour reform in Alsace-
Moselle as opposed to the rest of France. As 16 hours per year correspond
to 0.35 hour per week, workers in Alsace-Moselle were expected to work
0.35 hour more than workers in the rest of France in 2001 relative to
1999.
Also note that one expects to find two different types of firms and
workers in the data: those with a strict "per-week" application of the 35-
hour reform and those with an annualization of the hours worked. For
those with a strict per-week application of the reform, we expect workers
in Alsace-Moselle to work the same number of hours as in the rest of
France every week except on the two relevant weeks (December 26 and
Good Friday) and except in 2001-2. For those who tabulate hours an-
nually, we expect to observe fewer hours worked in Alsace-Moselle for
all weeks on average except in 2001-2. Therefore, to account for the
disparity between these two groups, the best measure of hours to be
considered is the usual number of hours worked. An alternative measure
(number of hours worked last week) will be a more noisy measure.
Finally, note that, given that firms were receiving subsidies, our paper
is about the effect of the combination of 35-hour reform and the subsidies,
like most previous empirical studies of the 35-hour reform. However,
subsidies in both France and Alsace-Moselle were calculated in the same
way. Therefore, a diffère nee-in-differences approach cancels out the effect
of subsidies and measures only the differential application of the reduction
in working time. This is an additional justification of our strategy."*
B. The Pros and Cons of This Identification Strategy
In previous sections of this paper, we extensively discussed the various
firm-level selection issues that make the evaluation more difficult. How-
ever, our difference-in-differences approach addresses these concerns by
comparing firms that switched to the 35-hour regime in Alsace-Moselle
to firms that switched regimes in the rest of France. Therefore, the only
difference between these firms is that, for historical reasons, the 35-hour
reform has been implemented in a milder way in Alsace-Moselle. Of
course, firms in Alsace-Moselle might have a systematically different 6^
compared to firms in France, but the outcomes of firms in Alsace-Moselle
are differenced before and after the reform so as to preclude any of these
systematic differences. Another problematic assumption with a difference-
in-differences approach is the "common time effects" assumption: in the
absence of the reform, firms in Alsace-Moselle may have evolved differ-
ently compared to firms in the rest of France. To address this concern,
* We thank a referee for this point.
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we will present DDD estimates, wherein the additional reference groups
will be based on those occupations or firms unaffected by the RWT (i.e.,
independent workers or firms with fewer than 20 employees).
A last concern is that our identification strategy is based on an impact
that has thus far not been documented, namely, the differential application
of the 35-hour reform in a particular region of France. This is why we
now check that the shock could indeed be detected in hours actually
worked.
V. Robustness and Falsifícation of the Identification Method
A. Sample
Our sample is based on France's Labor Force Survey, or Enquete Em-
ploi. We used the annual representative cross sections of the population
between 1996 and 2002, to which we added data from the 2003 cross
section. The latter has a different design but similar questions, thus making
it compatible with the previous data waves. As focusing solely on the
data for the years 1996-2002 did not change our results (available on
request), we present only the results obtained from the most exhaustive
data set of 1996-2003.
Appendix table Al reports summary statistics. It is also important to
note that, in contrast to other countries in which common law applies
and contracts are less specific, French labor laws require labor contracts
to be very explicit regarding the hours, pay, and tasks performed by
employees. As a consequence, when they are interviewed, employees have
precise knowledge regarding the number of hours they usually work and
the number of hours they worked during the previous week.*
B. First Check: A Double Difference Approach
For this first check, a simple difference-in-differences (DD) strategy is
used according to the following framework:
* We thank John Abowd for making this point to us. In confirmation of this
notion, we examined the survey from 2003, in which the data are continuous
throughout the entire year, whereas in earlier years, interviews were conducted
in March. In 2003, we found that workers reported having worked 27.43 hours
on average during the previous week in Alsace-Moselle when that week included
either Good Friday or Saint Stephen's Day. In those same weeks, they reported
35.48 hours on average during that same week for workers in the rest of France.
This is reported in app. table Al. These results are indicative of the precision of
hours reporting by employees: the reported difference in this example is exactly
8 hours, or an average working day.
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. hours,y, = a- + ß, + 7,(Alsace-Moselle) x (2003),^ ,
+ 72(Alsace-Moselle) x (2001-2),^,
+ 73(Alsace-Moselle) x (1999-2000)i,.,
+ ex,,, + rtjoh,,, + «„, (1)
where i corresponds to individual i,j to department/, and t to year i; the
dependent variable hours,,^ is the number of hours usually worked per
week by individual : (the sample is restricted to employed full-time in-
dividuals);^ a, are department fixed effects (95); ß, are year fixed effects
(seven); (AJsace-Moselle) x (2003),^ , is a variable that takes the value one
if individual i works in Alsace-Moselle and is interviewed in 2003; (Alsace-
Moselle) X (2001-2),,, is a variable that takes the value one if individual i
works in Alsace-Moselle and is interviewed in 20Q1 or 2002; and (Alsace-
Moselle) X (1999-2000),^, is a variable that takes the value one if individual
/• works in Alsace-Moselle and is interviewed in 1999 or 2000. Therefore,
the reference period is between 1996 and 1998. The coefficient of interest
is 72, which measures the relative increase in hours worked by individuals
in Alsace-Moselle after the reform. If the identification strategy is correct,
this coefficient should be equal to 0.35, as stated above: 2 days, or 16
hours, per year correspond to 0.35 hour per week over the year. A co-
efficient 7, not significantly different from zero would be consistent with
the fact that the 2002 decision by the local council (prud'homme de Metz)
effectively forbade the practice of converting public holidays into RWT
days and effectively canceled the regional disparity in the implementa-
tion of the 35-hour reform. The introduction of the variable (Alsace-
Moselle) x (1999-2000),,, allows us to test the common time effects as-
sumption. This assumption states that treated individuals, had they not
been treated, should evolve in the same way as nontreated individuals. A
coefficient 73 not significantly different from zero means that prior to the
reform there was no significant difference in the evolution of individuals
within and outside of Alsace-Moselle, confirming the common time effects
assumption. Additionally, 14 control variables (five age dummies, sex, size
of the household, and seven diploma dummies) and 30 occupation fixed
effects are included in the analysis.
' We considered only full-time workers because the theoretical effect of an
increase of 0.35 hour for Alsace-Moselle workers is calculated for full-time work-
ers. There are 1.4 million individuals in the database. Of these, only 627,820
individuals are employed, with 466,742 employed as full-time workers. There are
111,215 part-time workers; a further 49,863 individuals have an unreported work
duration and were thus dropped from the analysis. We repeated all analyses with
the full sample of full-time and part-time workers, and results do not vary, prob-
ably because of the low number of part-time workers.
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Standard errors are clustered at the level of the department to take into
account issues of serial correlation within a department, the unit at which
the reform is implemented (Moulton 1990) that may arise in a DD es-
timation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Gonley and Taber
(forthcoming) further discuss the issues arising in a DD estimation when
the treated group and the number of policy changes are small. They show
that the difference between the estimated and true coefficients is equal to
the difference of the sum of the disturbance terms for the treated unit
before and after the implementation of the policy. This may not tend
toward zero when the treated group is small, especially if there are time-
varying department-specific effects from 1996 to 2003, the time period
of our sample.^ In addition to clustering at the level of the department,
we also apply the Conley-Taber methodology to find confidence intervals
for our results. This methodology basically builds a confidence interval
for the DD coefficient by estimating the empirical distribution, in the
control group, of the difference of the sum of the disturbance terms for
the unit before and after the implementation of the policy. We will sys-
tematically report the confidence intervals in the text.
Table 1 presents the results of this DD approach. In column 1, the
sample is restricted to workers in occupations affected by the 35-hour
reform. Indeed, not all occupations are affected by the regulation: typically
self-employed workers were left unaffected by the 35-hour law. The re-
sults are fairly similar to what we expected: 73, the coefficient in front of
(Alsace-Moselle) X (2001-2),,,, is equal to 0.38 and is statistically signifi-
cant. Note that this corresponds closely to the predicted value of 0.35
(see the /?-value in table 1). This means that affected workers in Alsace-
* Note that we will mostly present triple differences, which control for the
presence of time-varying department-specific effects from 1996 to 2003. Addi-
tionally, we cluster the standard errors at a finer level, the sampling stratum, i.e.,
the well-defined neighborhoods in which all households are interviewed. There
are 238 such clusters in Alsace-Moselle. Results do not change and are available
on request. The occupations affected by the 35-hour reform are cadres dc la
fonction publique; professeurs; professions scientifiques; professions de l'in-
formation, des arts, et des spectacles; cadres administratifs et commerciaux
d'entreprises; ingénieurs et cadres techniques d'entreprises; instituteurs et assi-
milés; professions intermédiaires de la santé et du travail social; professions in-
termédiaires administratives de la fonction publique; professions intermédiaires
administratives et commerciales des entreprises; techniciens; contrematres; agents
de matrise; employés civils et agents de service de la fonction publique; policiers
et militaires; employés administratifs d'entreprises; employés de commerce; ouv-
riers qualifiés industriels; ouvriers qualifiés de type artisanal; chauffeurs; ouvriers
qualifiés de la manutention, du magasinage, et du transport; ouvriers non qualifiés
de type industriel; ouvriers non qualifiés de type artisanal; and ouvriers agricoles.
The occupations unaffected by the 35-hour reform are agriculteurs, artisans, com-
merçants et assimilés, chefs d'entreprise de 10 salariés ou plus; and professions
libérales.
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Moselle worked 0.38 hour more per week than their counterparts in
France in 2001-2 compared to 1996-98. Thus, the 35-hour reform was
indeed milder in Alsace-Moselle than in the rest of France. This difference
disappears in 2003 since 7, is not significantly different from zero, which
was expected because of the decision by the local council {prud'homme
de Metz). The common time effects assumption is valid since 73 is not
significantly different from zero.
C. Second Check: A Triple Difference Based on Affected Occupations
A falsification exercise is presented in column 2 of table 1. We should
see no difference between Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France for in-
dividuals in occupations unaffected by the 35-hour reform. Indeed, col-
umn 2 of table 1 shows that the difference between Alsace-Moselle and
the rest of France is not significant for individuals working in unaffected
occupations.
As noted previously, Alsace and Moselle are the only French areas that
share a border with Germany. Many French workers cross the border to
find work in Germany. Thus, a particular macroeconomic cycle in Ger-
many could significantly affect performance in Alsace-Moselle. As a con-
sequence, we would then run the risk of confounding the impact of the
reform with a particular event that might have taken place in Germany
at the same time. The inclusion of (Alsace-Moselle) x (1999-2000),, con-
stitutes a first step in showing that there is no systematic difference in
the evolution of Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France over time. All the
information can be collapsed in a DDD approach, which compares in-
dividuals within Alsace-Moselle who are more or less affected by the
35-hour reform while at the same time exposed to the same German
macroeconomic trend. This strategy relies on the assumption that all oc-
cupations in Alsace-Moselle are equally affected by the German macro-
economic cycle.
Column 3 of table 1 presents the DDD results. The "affected individual"
dummy variable, equal to one if the individual has an occupation affected
by the 35-hour reform, zero otherwise, is interacted with department
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and (Alsace-Moselle) x (2003)^,, (Alsace-
Moselle) X (2001-2).^„ and (Alsace-Moselle) x (1999-2000),,,. The coeffi-
cient of interest is the one in front of (Alsace-Moselle) x (2001-2) x
(affected individuals),^,. This coefficient is significantly positive and is ap-
proximately 0.75, although the theoretical coefficient 0.35 falls within the
confidence interval (see the p-value in the table). This is a confirmation
that the impact of the 35-hour reform was indeed milder in Alsace-Moselle
than in the rest of France.
Standard errors are clustered at the department level. Results hold when
standard errors are clustered at the less aggregated level of the sampling
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stratum. Following the Conley-Taber methodology, we find that the
DDD coefficient is 0.73 (close to the coefficient of 0.75 in the table) and
that the confidence interval for this coefficient is [0.18, 1.73] at the 90%
level and [0.09, 2.14] at the 95% level. We may thus be confident that the
significance of our results is not driven by the madequacy of the asymp-
totic assumption in our study.
D. Robustness III: A Triple Difference Based on Affected Occupations,
the Size of Firms, and Sectoral Collective Agreements
In this subsection, we refine the triple differences by further restricting
the treated group according to the size of the firm and the sector of activity.
As noted above, the Aubry I law specified that in 2000 (for firms with
over 20 employees) or in 2002 (for smaller firms), the 35-hour workweek
would both be irreversible and be uniformly applied to al! firms, even
those not having signed an agreement. Therefore, in order to capture the
causal effect of the 35-hour reform, we could compare individuals working
in firms with more than 20 employees to individuals working in firms
with fewer than 20 employees, in Alsace-Moselle compared to the rest
of France, and in 2001-2 compared to 1996-98. This strategy would rely
on the assumption that firms with more or fewer than 20 employees in
Alsace-Moselle are equally affected by the German macroeconomic trend.
Appendix table A2 replicates the analysis performed in table 1 and finds
similar results when undertaking this DDD strategy.
There are also important differences across sectors of the economy,
stemming from local collective labor agreements {conventions collectives)
that regulate all aspects of work. A collective agreement is an agreement
negotiated between employers and trade unions in order to clarify general
dispositions from the Code du Travail. There are 528 national, regional,
and depanmental collective agreements in France. After we examine
Lower Rhine's {département du Bas-Rhin., one of the two subregions in
Alsace) 10 collective agreements. Upper Rhine's (the other département
in Alsace) one, Alsace's four regionwide agreements. Moselle's six, and
Lorraine's one, it is interesting to note that only four sectors (retailing
and repairs, metallurgy and metal transformation, construction, and hotels
and restaurants) have collective agreements that do not explicitly mention
the two supplementary public holidays. We argue that it has been easier
for employers to substitute public holidays for RWT days in these four
sectors since workers in these sectors seem to be less aware of their rights.
In other sectors, however, it may have been less easy to do so. Therefore,
we deemed the four aforementioned sectors, which experienced a milder
application of the 35-hour reform, as the "treated group," and all other
sectors were included as the "control group." As m table 1, we present
the DDD results associated with these affected firms, or affected sectors.
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in appendix table A2. We may also combine these three triple differences
based on affected occupations, affected firms, and affected sectors in a
single triple difference.
In column 4 of table 1, the sample is restricted to individuals employed
in an affected occupation, in an affected firm, and in an affected sector.
The coefficient in front of (Alsace-Moselle) x(2001-2),y,, 7^, is equal to
0.92 and is statistically significant. This coefficient is slightly higher than
expected. In column 5, the sample is restricted to individuals working in
occupations unaffected by the 35-hour reform, OR working in firms em-
ploying fewer than 20 employees, OR working in sectors unaffected by
the 35-hour reform. There is no significant effect of the reform, as ex-
pected. In column 6, the coefficient of interest is (Alsace-Moselle) x
(2001-2) X (affected individuals),^,, a DDD coefficient. This coefficient
measures the relative increase in hours worked for affected as opposed
to unaffected individuals, in Alsace Moselle compared to the rest of
France, and in 2001-2 compared to 1996-98. The coefficient in column
6 is significant and positive (0.75), and the theoretical coefficient 0.35 still
falls within the confidence interval. We obtain the same high significance
level for the coefficients of interest with alternative clusters ("sampling
stratum") or without any cluster (results available on request). The DDD
Conley-Taber coefficient is 0.66 (close to the coefficient of 0.75 in the
table), and the Conley-Taber confidence interval for this coefficient is
[0.007, 1.47] at the 90% level.
E. Robustness and Falsification IV
There is an alternative way to account for economic cycles from other
countries (i.e., Germany). In particular, one could estimate a simple double
difference by attempting to control for the GDP growth of the foreign
country. To identify the coefficient, one would then take into account the
GDP growth of all France's bordering countries. In our case, the two
départements of Alsace border Germany, and Moselle shares a border
with Germany and Luxembourg. The French département du Nord bor-
ders Belgium, and a few other départements in France share a border with
Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. Including ail these border effects (and count-
ing half the border effect when a département has a border with two
countries), we compute a border x GDP growth effect, which can be seen
in table 1, where border is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the
individual lives in a department bordering a country and zero otherwise.'
' Border is a dummy variable equal to one for all départements close to a border.
Department 54 is close to Luxembourg; 57, 67, and 68 are close to Germany; 90,
25, 39, 1, and 74 are close to Switzerland; 73, 74, 4, 5, and 6 are close to Italy;
and 66, 9, 31, 65, and 64 are close to Spain. Data on GDP were collected from
the OECD Web site.
35-Hour Workweek in France 509
Column 7 includes the new border x GDP growth effect term. First, there
is not a significant change in the coefficient of interest (hours worked),
and second, the GDP growth effect coefficient is positive (although in-
significant)."
The last falsification test of the identification strategy has been to apply
the same DD analysis to all regions in France. Indeed, owing to sample
size limitations in the labor force survey, we could have found spurious
results indicating that the number of work hours declared in Alsace-
Moselle increased relative to the rest of France in 2001-2. Replacing
Alsace-Moselle with any other region should yield no significant results.
If this is the case, we could be more confident that we are effectively
picking up an "exogenous" regional specificity of Alsace-Moselle. Indeed,
we replicated column 6 of table 1 for the 21 regions in France and obtained
reassuring results. Out of the 21 regions," only Alsace and Lorraine had
positive and significant coefficients. Overall, these findings lend support
to Alsace's specificity and the exogeneity of the relative increase in hours
in triple differences.
VI. Impact of the 35-Hour Reform on Other Outcomes
In light of the previous section, we can be fairly confident that the
application of working time reduction was different in Alsace-Moselle
than in the rest of France. We can also be confident that this difference
is exogenous and due to the specificity of labor laws. Considering that
the reform was 10% less effective in Alsace-Moselle, the next step is to
establish how various economic variables evolved in Alsace-Moselle rel-
ative to France in the period 2001-2. If it evolves positively, that is, if
we obtain a positive coefficient for the variable (Alsace-Moselle) x
(2001-2) X (treatment group), this means that the RWT had a negative
impact on the specific variable under investigation. A negative coefficient
implies a positive RWT effect on that variable, whereas insignificant co-
efficients imply that the effects of the reform are nonexistent, or at least
not strong enough to be detected in the data.
A. The Employment Effect
To establish the individual employment effect, employment rates in
Alsace-Moselle are compared to those in the rest of France in 2001-2
compared to 1996-98. While the 2003 Enquete Emploi provides infor-
mation concerning workers' specific departments, a difficulty arises in
that the data on unemployed, or inactive, individuals include only the
^ We replicated the analysis with GDP per capita growth in place of GDP
growth. The main coefficient on hours is not significantly affected.
' As Gorsica has no regional code standing in the Enquête Emploi, 21 instead
of 22 regions were accounted for.
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regions (groupings of three to four departments) in which they live. Thus,
we drop the year 2003 in this section.
Table 2 examines the relationship between the milder reform in Alsace-
Moselle in 2000 and employment in the full sample. The dependent var-
iable is a dichotomous variable taking the value one if the individual is
employed and zero in any other case (i.e., the individual may be unem-
ployed or inactive).
In column 1, the sample is restricted to occupations affected by the 35-
hour reform.'° Note that the sample cannot be restricted to firms with
more than 20 employees, or to sectors affected by the reform, since we
do not know the firm size or activity sector of unemployed or inactive
individuals. The coefficient of (Alsace-Moselle) x (2001-2) is not signifi-
cantly different from zero, indicating that the milder version of the reform
had no effect on employment.
In column 2, the sample is restricted to occupations unaffected by the
35-hour reform. In column 3, the coefficient of interest is (Alsace-
Moselle) X (2001-2) X (affected individuals), a DDD coefficient, where af-
fected individuals is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual
has an occupation affected by the 35-hour reform and zero otherwise.
As shown in table 2, the coefficient of interest is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. This indicates that there is no difference in local em-
ployment in Alsace-Moselle relative to the rest of France as a result of
the milder version of the 35-hour reform. This result is in concordance
with the findings of Estevao and Sa (2006), who argued on the basis of
firms' size that the employment effect is difficult to estimate and found
it to be generally insignificant. As small and large firms may be differ-
entially affected by macroeconomic shocks, our strategy may be consid-
ered especially robust in that our analysis is based on both regions and
the occupations of individuals, regardless of the size of the firm in which
they work.
Columns 4 and 5 investigate the differential effect of the 35-hour reform
on various groups. In these columns, the sample is restricted, respectively,
to high schooi graduates and non-high school graduates. Results are al-
ways insignificant."
Column 6 introduces, as in table 1, an interacted term between a border
dummy variable (taking the value one if the individual lives in a depart-
ment sharing a border with a country, zero otherwise) and the GDP
growth of this particular country. When foreign business cycles are ac-
counted for, no effect is found on employment.
'°We know the occupations of 73,875 unemployed individuals and 115,732
inactive individuals, making this estimation feasible.
"A similar test was conducted for individuals younger than 40 years old and
individuals older than 40 years old, with insignificant results.
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While columns 1-6 focus on the individual employment effect, a similar
analysis may be led at a more aggregated level. We thus estimate the
number of individuals employed in a certain department to test whether
the milder version of the 35-hour reform in Alsace-Moselle had an in-
fluence on the total number of jobs. This is especially interesting since
we may further discriminate between jobs likely affected, or not, by the
35-hour reform. In column 7, the dependent variable is the log of the
number of individuals employed per department in occupations affected
by the 35-hour reform, AND in firms employing more than 20 employees,
AND in sectors affected by the 35-hour reform. No effect is found on the
number of jobs theoretically affected by the 35-hour reform in Alsace-
Moselle after the reform. However, this could be due to border effects
with Germany. We thus look at other jobs not likely affected by the 35-
hour reform. In column 8, the dependent variable is the log of the number
of individuals employed in occupations not affected by the 35-hour re-
form, OR in firms employing fewer than 20 employees, OR in sectors not
affected by the 35-hour reform. No significant effect is found on total
employment in Alsace-Moselle after 2000. In column 9, the coefficient of
interest is (Alsace-Moselle) x (2001-2) x (affected individuals), a DDD co-
efficient, where affected individuals is a dichotomous variable equal to
one if the log of the number of individuals employed concerns individuals
employed in occupations affected by the 35-hour reform, AND in firms
employing more than 20 employees, AND in sectors affected by the 35-
hour reform, zero otherwise. The DDD coefficient is insignificant, in-
dicating that the effect of the reform on total employment is insignificantly
different from zero. Conley-Taber confidence intervals were also com-
puted and indicate no significant impact of the reform on employment.
B. The Unemployment Effect
Another outcome of interest is unemployment. Table 3 examines the
relationship between the milder 2000 reform in Alsace-Moselle and un-
employment. The dependent variable is an unemployment dummy (one
if unemployed, zero if employed). This subsection is thus different from
the previous one since the sample in Section VI.A included all individuals
(employed, unemployed, and inactive), whereas the sample in this sub-
section includes only employed and unemployed individuals.
In column 1, the sample is restricted to occupations affected by the 35-
hour reform. No effect is found of the milder reform in Alsace-Moselle
in 2001 and 2002. In column 2, the sample is restricted to occupations
unaffected by the 35-hour reform. In column 3, the coefficient of interest
is (Alsace-Moselle) x (2001-2) x (occupations affected), a DDD coeffi-
cient. Again, we find that the coefficient of Interest is not significantly
different from zero.
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Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample, respectively, to high school grad-
uates and non-high school graduates. Results are always insignificant.'^
Column 6 controls for the potential impact of foreign business cycles.
The analysis may be undertaken at a more aggregated level. Unem-
ployment rates may be calculated at the department level. However, the
DDD analysis performed in columns 7, 8, and 9 of table 2 may not be
undertaken in this section because the firm's size and the sector of activity
of an unemployed individual are by definition not known. To control for
border effects, we thus perform a simple DD analysis with total unem-
ployment rates, controlling for the GDP growth of neighboring countries.
Robust standard errors clustered at the department level are presented.
Conley-Taber confidence intervals were also computed and indicate no
significant impact of the reform on unemployment.
C. Other Outcomes
Table 4 presents additional results based on variables such as wages and
leisure activities. Although some of the coefficients do not reach signif-
icance, all significant coefficients provide confirmatory evidence for the
identification strategy: there were fewer leisure activities and lower hourly
wages in Alsace-Moselle than in the rest of France over the period 2001-2.
In particular, we find that over the period 2001-2, individuals in Alsace-
Moselle had a lower propensity to be wiUing to work more; went to
exhibitions less frequently; read fewer books compared to the rest of
France, although not significantly; and finally read fewer newspapers.
However, they did not watch less television: this is indicative of the relative
elasticities of various types of leisure with respect to available time.
VII. What We May Conclude
Our paper had three aims. The first was to verify, from a purely de-
scriptive standpoint, that earlier findings by law scholars (e.g., Grisey-
Martinez 2005) would be confirmed by the data. These works are legal
analyses of the process of working time reduction in Alsace-Moselle and
how the national Aubry laws interfered with the local laws of German
origin. These works indicate that 2001-2 was an ambiguous period con-
cerning the application of the Aubry laws, an ambiguity favorable to
employers. In fact, in Section V, we did find that the number of weekly
hours worked in Alsace-Moselle increased relative to the rest of France
by 0.35 hour on average, which represents 16 hours (2 days) per year.
The second aim was to verify whether the 35-hour reform had a sig-
nificant impact on employment growth, as claimed by its proponents.
Our claim here is that a milder application of the 35-hour reform in
'^  A similar test was conducted for individuals younger than 40 years old and
individuals older than 40 years old, with insignificant results.
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Alsace-Moselle evidenced no impact on relative employment in that re-
gion. We cannot conclude with certainty that the aggregate impact of the
35-hour reform was close to zero. However, our results are certainly
consistent with this interpretation.
How do our estimates compare to previous estimates of the impact of
the 35-hour reduction? In earlier works, the most optimistic estimates
about the effect were that approximately 500,000 jobs were created,
whereas more conservative estimates were closer to 100,000-200,000 jobs.
These estimates consistently fell within the range of our data, primarily
because of the large standard errors. Despite the lack of precision of the
coefficients in tables 2 and 3 {the employment and unemployment effects,
respectively), we may want to say something about the gross numbers
implied by these estimates. Indeed, we can obtain gross numbers in mul-
tiplying the marginal effect coefficients (Alsace-Moselle x 2001-2) by the
total number of employees in France and by a factor of 10 to get the full
effect of the working time reduction (since the difference in implemen-
tation is by 10% of the total effect). The mean effect of table 2 is 155,000
jobs created. However, this range is extremely sizable, gomg at least from
- 1 million to +1 million jobs (or about 5% of total employment). More-
over, the signs of the effect vary from one specification to the other. The
conclusion is that previous estimates of the employment effect are not
entirely inconsistent with our results, but rather that we cannot find any
significant effect of the 35-hour reform using our empirical strategy.
The third aim was methodological: we have shown that lnterestmg
identification strategies based on local specificities in France were possible.
Prior to our study, the belief was that most legal changes apply to the
entire nation. In reality, France is a rather interesting aggregation of re-
gional disparities. The example used in the present paper sheds light on
one prominent example of regional disparities, and researchers may be
well served to explore other such geographic disparities in future research.
Appendix
Table Al
Descriptive Statistics
Average number of hours worked per
weeli (all workers)
Average number of hours worked per
weelt (only full-time workers)
Number of fiours worked last week
Restricted sample:'
Average number of hours worked per
weeK (only full-time workers)
Number of nours worked last week
Triple differences on hours:**
Proportion of workers in big firms
(more than 20 employees)
Proponion of workers in affected
sectors
Proportion of workers in affected
occupations
Proportion of workers in affected
group (big firms AND affected sectors
AND affected occupations)
Control variables:
Age:
15-24 years
25-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60+ years
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male)
Household size
Highest degree completed:
Postsecondary education
High school + 2 years
High school
Tecrmical degree
Secondary school
No degree
Labor market outcomes:
Employed (1 if employed, 0 otherwise)
Unemployed (1 = unemployed, 0 =
employed)
Hourly wage
Log of hourly wage
Alsace-Moselle
Mean
37.09
39.93
36.67
39.32
27.43
.86
.22
.84
.15
.11
.36
.05
.29
.17
.64
2.98
.00
21
.05
.37
.14
.12
.47
.09
55.64
3.93
SD
10.23
7.83
13.69
9.41
15.62
,34
.41
.37
.35
.32
.48
.22
.45
.38
.48
1.21
.01
.41
.22
.48
.35
.33
.50
.28
29.76
.41
N
29,607
24,793
24,262
159
128
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24.879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
24,879
95,958
49,639
18,426
18,426
Rest of France
Mean
37.54
40.53
37.43
40.97
35.48
.85
.19
.80
.12
.10
.32
.07
.30
.20
.61
2.99
.00
.23
.07
.31
.14
.13
.45
.11
54.79
3.90
SD
11.14
9.08
14.20
10.12
13.72
.36
.39
.40
.32
.30
.47
.25
.46
.40
.49
1.22
.01
.42
.26
.46
.35
.33
.50
.31
36.82
.42
N
530,560
439.499
426,565
4,104
3,101
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
441,600
1,287,962
652,174
301,612
301,612
' The sample is restricted to the rwo weeks with public holidays only in Alsate-Moselle in 2003 (the
only year in which data were collected throughout the year, as opposed to March for the previous
rounds). The two weeks are those thai include Good Friday {April 18, so April 14-20) and Saint Stephen's
Day (December 26, so December 22-27),
The sample is restricted to full-time workers (466,479 observations).
520
1
S:
ID
i O ^
E
w
00 rv 1/1 «*fN -^ >f¡ p>j
o íN Ö »^
2 ï
J t
s
«
o
sU
a
3
oS
w
c«
<
oS
U
<
oS
u
O
S E «J "w "T«
521
QOJ
!U
O >-„
•"^  _2 (N
V C L , ' - '
UJ
• % . " *
. . *-• rt "
Q
ñ"? ä iB- = Jl 'G-= u c i 3 =
35-Hour Workweek in France 523
References :
Askenazy, Philippe. 2005. 35 hours and employment: A critical review of
first ex post evaluations. Paper presented at the Conservatoire National
des Arts et Métiers conference, Paris, http://hussonet.free.fr/35asken
.pdf.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. How
much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 119, no. 1:249-75.
Burda, Michael, and Philippe Weil. 2005. Blue laws. ECARES discussion
paper, Free University of Brussels.
Cahuc, Pierre. 2001. Les expériences françaises de réduction du temps de
travail: Moins d'emplois et plus d'inégalités. Revue Française d'Eco-
nomie 15, no. 3:141-66.
Calmfors, Lars, and Michael Hoel. 1988. Work sharing and overtime.
Scandinavian Journal of Economies 90, no. 1:45-62.
Conley, Timothy, and Christopher Taber. Forthcoming. A note on in-
ference with "difference in differences" with a small number of policy
changes. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Crépon, Bruno, and Francis Kramarz. 2002. Employed 40 hours or not-
employed 39: Lessons from the 1982 mandatory reduction of the work-
week./owmti/ of Political Economy 110, no. 6:1355-89.
Crépon, Bruno, Marie Leclair, and Sébastien Roux. 2004. RTT, produc-
tivité et emploi: Nouvelles estimations sur données d'entreprises. Eco-
nomie et Statistique, nos. 376-77:55-90.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. 1971. Heterogeneous labor, the internal labor mar-
ket, and the dynamics of the employment-hours decision. Journal of
Economic Theory 3, no. 1:85-104.
Estevao, Marcello, and Filipa Sa. 2006. Are the French happy with the
35-hour workweek? IZA Discussion Paper no. 2459, Institute for the
Study of Labor, Bonn.
Grisey-Martinez, Laurence. 2005. Jours fériés et temps de travail: Une
combinaison délicate. Revue du Droit Local, no. 44:1-10.
Hunt, Jennifer. 1999. Has work-sharing worked in Germany? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114, no. 1:117-48.
Kramarz, Francis, Pierre Cahuc, Bruno Crépon, Oskar Nordstrom Skans,
Gijsbert van Lomwel, Thorsten Schank, and André Zylberberg. 2008.
Labour market effects of work-sharing arrangements in Europe. In
Working hours and job sharing in the EU and USA: Are Europeans
lazy? Or Americans crazy f ed. Tito Boeri, Michael Burda, and Francis
Kramarz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marimon, Ramon, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2000. Employment and distri-
butional effects of restricting working time. European Economic Review
44, no. 7:1291-1326.
524 Chemin/Wasmer
Moulton, Brent. 1990. An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects
of aggregate variables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics
72, no. 2:334-38.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1968. Shon-run employment variation on class-I rail-
roads in the U.S., 1947-1963. Econometrica 36, no. 3:511-29.
Copyright of Journal of Labor Economics is the property of University of Chicago Press and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
